2 brutal Stalinist states made effective opposition difficult. According to these accounts, only when the state weakened -owing to political infighting between hardliners and moderates in the period of de-Stalinization, or after the signing of human rights protocols with the West in the mid-1970s -did greater possibilities for resistance develop. Yet these analyses too often assume that a society in opposition will always combat the state given sufficient opportunities. 5 Much less attention has been paid to the range of strategies that social groups used in order to survive under illegitimate power and the varied (and often ambivalent) attitudes they held towards the expression of resistance. 6 This article will explore the variety of attitudes towards, and expressions of, opposition by the Budapest middle classes, in their encounter with the Communist state between its inception in 1948 and its initial breakdown in the 1956 uprising. 7 Most members of the middle classes experienced discrimination and persecution on account of their class background. 8 Even those who had been initially sympathetic to the Communist project were questioning their allegiance and turning against the state by the early 1950s. Yet the middle class did not express their opposition to the regime in uniform ways; some engaged in active opposition whilst others deliberately withdrew from direct political confrontation.
The choice to resist was not dependent on the degree to which different groups felt opposed to Communism, but rather on the extent to which they thought it appropriate to engage politically with illegitimate power. The codes which defined acceptable levels of engagement were shaped by different political traditions within the middle class. 3 Conservatives, who abhorred the Communist state more than any other group, saw engagement, even in the form of resistance, as collaboration with an illegitimate regime.
Liberals, by contrast, saw political involvement, albeit at the margins of Communist society, as crucial to their identities. Socialists had the most complex attitudes to engagement: they withdrew from political opposition when their dislike of the Stalinist state was at its most intense, but engaged in open political struggle when the reestablishment of the integrity of the Communist movement became a realistic possibility after 1953.
The evidence is primarily drawn from an oral history project in which I interviewed seventy-six individuals from the Budapest middle class, born between 1907 and 1938, about their experiences of the Second World War, the liberation era and the early Communist state. These interviews addressed not only resistance, but also topics such as private life, educational and professional attainment, and the evolution of political attitudes. They were conducted between 1998 and 2000 and averaged around three hours in length. There were thirty-one female and forty-five male respondents. All interviewees were promised anonymity; hence all names used are pseudonyms.
This article focuses on how individuals responded to Communist power and how they interpreted their behaviour. Hence it is not useful to impose any strict criteria on what resistance entails; rather, it is more informative to explore the conflicting definitions offered by the respondents themselves. For this reason, any act, from listening to jazz in private or discussing the behaviour of Red Army soldiers amongst groups of friends, to 4 establishing an anti-Communist organization or engaging in sabotage, will be considered resistance so long as it was consciously pursued as such. At the same time, it is also important to analyse those acts which undermined the norms of Communist behaviour, even when not defined as resistance by respondents. It is revealing to examine why certain forms of opposition were not considered to be resistance; certainly, they should not be ignored because they were not consciously defined as such. War, these political divides were reinforced by social and religious divisions within the middle class; the public sector was dominated by those from conservative Christian gentry backgrounds who had been promoted by Horthy, whereas a more heterogeneous entrepreneurial and professional middle class (which included many from Jewish backgrounds 9 ) was mainly liberal-left in political outlook. Thus in the decades which 5 preceded the Communist take-over, middle-class Hungarians" lives had been moulded as much by their political allegiances as by their social background.
The conservative middle class was more deeply opposed to the Communist state than any other of these groups. Hungarian conservatism itself had grown out of a fear of radical left-wing upheaval; many had been drawn to the right-wing authoritarianism of the Although he wanted the system changed he nevertheless dismissed political resistance.
He refused to take part because it would have made him a politically complicit "servant of the regime":
Dezső: They [my friends] were perhaps nearer the regime and were willing to do things in a conscious way, and I remember quoting Illyés 16 day-in-day-out. He was asked why he wasn"t at the forefront of this movement. Illyés" answer was, "This is the revolt of the servants, and I was never a servant." Now I remember my saying this to [my friends], that, well, you know, I wasn"t a "cseléd"
[servant], you know, Litván 17 , yes, he was a "cseléd", it was a great thing that he did, but, you know, it wasn"t really my business. 12 Whereas conservative respondents presented resistance as inappropriate and shameful, other respondents celebrated even minor acts of defiance:
Lóránt: There were other things which were a demonstration of some form of independence. There was certain music, for example, which was completely prohibited -Wagner was one -and there were some underground places where records were played, and one went to these gatherings, and one felt that there were infiltrators there. One knew that the fact that one went to these places was reported somewhere. I saw this really as fumigating myself. It is in these little things one could assert a degree of heroism.
It"s a rather petty one, if you see what I mean. And it didn"t do any good to anybody else. It didn"t help anybody; it didn"t set a single person free. But we indulged in this thing proudly.
Interviewees who idealized resistance were mainly from liberal backgrounds, and were largely confined to those who came from entrepreneurial or professional middle-class milieux, including many from Jewish families. Although liberalism was a spent political force by 1945, 18 it still remained an important badge of personal identity for many after the war, associated with the realization of progressive goals, such as land and wealth redistribution, within the context of a stable democratic system. 19 Whereas conservatives 13 related how depoliticized their communities had become, liberals charted how the "antifascist" consensus of the post-war democratic system had reinvigorated their engagement with politics. Their active resistance after 1948 was a result of this reawakening; it was this progressive democratic system they sought to restore following its destruction by the Despite this, she was surprised when two of her colleagues were executed and she herself received a prison sentence. Even when involved in a terrorist anti-state organization, she believed that she "hardly did anything" and expected that the Communist state would judge her opposition more fairly:
Rózsa: …I mean I wasn"t really doing anything, come to think of it (laughs)…although it was nothing, in objective terms, 16 they hadn"t done anything at all, in the end two of them were executed…my husband got a life sentence and I got fourteen years for that. We hardly did anything.
Whilst liberals engaged in dissenting activities throughout the early Communist period, the extent to which they resisted at any given time was determined by the opportunities provided by the system. Before 1953, most felt that open, direct opposition was impossible. Rather, they engaged in what James C. Scott termed "infrapolitical" resistance; 22 finding subtle, indirect ways to undermine power that would be difficult to detect or punish. Liberal respondents reported that they used graffiti, rumour-mongering and joke-telling:
Dávid: Well for example, there were some serious cases at the school -the walls always had to be decorated, the pictures of our leaders were always there…I think on one occasion we had a special May 1 decoration and the slogan "Éljen Rákosi" was put up and someone in pencil put an F in front of Éljen, which became Féljen, and instead of "Long Live Rákosi", it said "Rákosi should be afraid", and they were searching the whole school and questioning students and they never found out who did it.
Of course we knew who did it. 17 Liberals presented the death of Stalin in 1953 as a turning point. Under a weakened state, they began to form networks of opposition. Army service was often mentioned by men as an environment in which they discovered that those from other social backgrounds were equally alienated from the regime. No longer believing that they were isolated in their anti-Communism, they were spurred on to further oppositional activity:
Ödön:
The only place where you could eventually find out about people"s real thinking was the army…masks fell away from a certain number of people and I still remember how shocked I was when one of these peasant boys, who owed everything to the Communist Party, told me once, when we were resting between two bouts of exercise, "they only have to teach me how to get behind enemy lines and they will never see me again"
(laughs)…So, very paradoxically, in the army, where you suffer from restrictions…we had more freedom there because people talked to each other, especially when there was a person-to-person situation. You were sent out, two people to stand guard in front of the ammunition…and, you know, between two and four in the morning you walk up and down there, and you struggle against sleep and you are much more honest with each other. 18 Unlike conservatives, liberals" idealization of resistance meant that after 1953 they were prepared to use the greater opportunities available to them under a weakened state to express new forms of dissent in public places. However, their earlier experience of "infrapolitical" resistance meant that they still disguised their activities to avoid punishment. Pál hid his new public opposition behind a demonstration which appeared to be focussing on a non-political sporting issue:
Pál:
The first time I protested in the street followed the intellectual "big mouthiness"… Their withdrawal from politics was also due to the erosion of their belief that they were qualified to critique the system effectively. They had internalized the Communist idea that they were, at best, reformed members of the "former exploiting classes", and were not able to judge the best interests of "the masses". Their final disaffection with the movement was seldom presented as the product of their own experiences; rather, their stories of departure nearly always focussed on the discovery of the suffering of other social groups -such as poor peasants (see the above quotation) or the urban working class -to which the Communist state was expected to provide advantages.
Lastly, socialists refused to express opposition because they were unable to find social spaces in which to resist the regime in meaningful ways. Liberals were able to find opportunities for dissent despite the Stalinist state"s effective control of the public sphere because they valued "infrapolitical resistance" at the margins. reformist-minded students in starting revolutionary movements. 36 In the 1970s, the leftwing British sociologist Bill Lomax argued that urban workers and their factory councils were the real embodiment of heroism. 37 In the 1970s and 1980s, the dissident socialist Many conservatives idealized the uprising, despite abhorring political resistance before 1956. Bálint characterized it as a "morally clean" revolution in which the nation was unified in struggle. He identified with the aims of the younger generation and workers, who he argued were the driving forces behind the revolution:
Bálint: It was an absolutely morally clean revolution -we were there so our impressions were direct ones. There was no looting…not one single case of looting. It"s so unusual…whenever there is an uprising the first thing is that people go looting…those who took part were all young people and it was not the intellectuals. Those who actively took part were not from the political strata but from the most suppressed ones: workers, young people, even some from the army or police…They were workers and simple people…no aristocrats, no noble people who were deprived of all their fortunes and so on. It was a spontaneous rising up in favour of something better.
In this quotation, he challenged those who demonized the revolution by questioning its social makeup, rejecting the Communist-sponsored image of 1956 as a reactionary aristocratic counter-revolution. He also refuted the left-wing interpretation which emphasized the role of dissident Communist Party intellectuals in fermenting the uprising, preferring to identify with the role of the "suppressed" and "simple" people who 32 spontaneously wanted "something better". The revolution was stripped of its political nuances in order that he could identify with its heroic protagonists. However, when asked about his own participation, he denied any personal involvement and categorized active insurgents as collaborators (who were prepared to "adapt to the circumstances"), from whom he had tried to distance himself in the aftermath of the revolution: Yet some studies have started the attempt to dismantle the idea of monolithic societal resistance and investigate the range of strategies used by Poles. Despite widespread opposition, some revisionist scholars have begun to address why certain groups decided to accommodate themselves to the Communist state. 44 Others have examined how social divides between different dissenters shaped very different approaches to resistance. In particular, some studies have emphasized the role of gender; for example, male protesters in heavy industry and shipbuilding frequently stressed the role of men in defending Poland and Polish workers" rights, and deliberately excluded women from public confrontation with the state. By contrast, some women viewed male, working-class protest as a form of collaboration as it accepted the state"s assumptions that only labour issues were a legitimate cause for confrontation whereas domestic and consumer issues were not. These women chose very different (and often more successful) strategies to express their opposition. 45 Only by removing ourselves from the demands of the post- 
